Grades of discrimination are relations that may fall short of genuine identity, but that behave like identity in important respects. Over the past decade or so, philosophers of mathematics and physics have investigated several of these grades of discrimination in great detail, from both philosophical and technical perspectives. This paper aims to complete the technical project, answering all of the mathematical questions that are fairly natural at this level of abstraction. This paper thereby provides a mathematical toolkit that will provide the backdrop for further philosophical discussion.
Preliminaries
There is a simple reason for interest in the grades of discrimination: they provide us with a natural way to calibrate relationships of similarity and difference.
More ambitiously, though, we might hope that some grade of discrimination will provide us with a genuinely illuminating answer to the question: When are objects identical? To take a simple example: set theory tells us that sets are identical iff they share all their members. This suggests that some grade of indiscernibility will provide a suitable criterion of identity in set-theoretic contexts (at least). 1 To take a more contentious example: we might become convinced (by thinking about theology, or about physics) that nature abhors a (non-trivial) symmetry. This suggests that some grade of symmetry will provide a suitable criterion of identity in empirical contexts (at least). More generally, then, we might look to grades of discrimination in the hope of providing a non-trivial criterion of identity.
The ambition here need not be reductive. We might simply seek an illuminating constraint upon the conditions under which objects can be distinct. That said, some philosophers have hoped to find a reductive criterion for identity, looking to replace the identity primitive with some defined grade of discrimination.
This reductive ambition is found among philosophers who have defended some 'Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles'. Such philosophers have, historically, focussed on the various grades of indiscernibility. However, their reductive ambitions might equally well be served by considering some of the other grades of discrimination.
This paper aims to provide a toolkit for the discussion surrounding these philosophical ambitions. However, these ambitions raise an important technical-cum-philosophical issue, which I shall need to discuss several times in what follows.
As we shall see, each grade of discrimination is defined with respect to a (model-theoretic) signature. So, consider a signature which contains just a few monadic predicates which stand for eye colour. If we present a non-trivial criterion of identity, in the form of a grade of discrimination defined with respect to this signature, then we shall be forced to say, absurdly, that there is at most one person with brown eyes. Consequently, any philosopher who wants to advance a non-trivial criterion of identity must not only select some appropriate grade of discrimination, but must also stipulate the particular signature she has in mind.
I shall return to this point several times. However, with these philosophical preliminaries out of the way, I shall present some notational preliminaries.
I always use 'L' to denote an arbitrary signature, i.e. a collection of constants, predicates and function-symbols. The philosophical discussion of grades of indiscernibility tends to be restricted to relational signatures (i.e. signatures which contain only predicates). 2 There is a reasonable philosophical motivation for this: if we assume that each constant names exactly one object, then we seem to presuppose that we understand rather a lot about the notion of identity before we begin; 3 likewise, the very idea of a function seems to presuppose the notion of identity; hence, if we want to avoid prejudging certain philosophical questions about identity, it might be wise to restrict our attention to relational signatures. The model-theoretic discussion of these issues, however, is less often restricted to relational signatures. There is a sensible technical motivation for this: many of the results hold in the more general case. The purpose of this paper is to provide philosophers with technical results. Accordingly, I shall in general allow signatures to contain both constants and functions, but I shall comment on the relational case when it is interestingly different. For technical simplicity, I always treat constants as 0-place function-symbols.
Where L is a signature, the L + -formulas are the first-order formulas formed in the usual way using any L-symbols and any symbols from standard firstorder logic with identity. In particular, then, they may contain the symbol '=', which always stands for (genuine) identity. The L − -formulas are those formed without the symbol '='. 4 L + k is the set of L + -formulas with free variables among v 1 , . . . , v k ; similarly for L − k . I use swash fonts for structures and italic fonts for their associated domains. So, where M is an L-structure, its domain is M. Where e = ⟨e 1 , . . . , e n ⟩ and π is a function from one structure to another, π(e) = ⟨π(e 1 ), . . . , π(e n )⟩.
Twelve grades of discrimination
I start by defining six grades of indiscernibility; three grades of L − -indiscernibility, and three grades of L + -indiscernibility. 5 Definition 2.1. Let M be an L-structure containing a and b. Say that:
Similarly, say that:
Here, ' p ' indicates pairwise indiscernibility; ' m ' indicates monadic indiscernibility; and no subscript indicates complete indiscernibility.
There are several alternative characterisations of ≈, two of which will prove useful: 6 Lemma 2.2. The following are equivalent to the claim that a ≈ b in M:
Quine was the first philosopher to analyse these grades of indiscernibility. His fullest discussion of them ended thus:
May there even be many intermediate grades? The question is ill defined. By imposing special conditions on the form or content of the open sentence used in discriminating two objects, we could define any number of intermediate grades of discriminability, subject even to no linear order. What I have called moderate discriminability [i.e. = p or ≈ p ], however, is the only intermediate grade that I see how to define at our present high level of generality. 7 Quine was right that we have essentially exhausted all of the grades of discrimination that are fairly natural, highly general, and which can be defined in terms of satisfaction of L − -and L + -formulas. 8 Nevertheless, there are other grades of discrimination that are fairly natural; we just need to consider alternative methods of definition. (The sense in which they are 'intermediate' grades will become clear in §3; as Quine conjectured, we shall see there that they are not linearly ordered.)
Instead of defining relations in terms of satisfaction of formulas, for example, we could define relations in terms of isomorphisms. As a reminder:
(1) e ∈ R M iff π(e) ∈ R N , for all n-place L-predicates R and all e ∈ M n 6 For case (1), see Casanovas et al. (1996, 508) . For case (2), see Ketland (2011, Theorem 3.17) . For further alternative characterisations of ≈, see see Ladyman et al. (2012, §6) .
7 Quine (1976, 116) . 8 That said, Caulton and Butterfield (2012) and Ladyman et al. (2012) explore the case of quantifier-free formulas.
(2) π(f M (e)) = f N (π(e)), for all n-place L-function-symbols f and all e ∈ M n A symmetry on M is an isomorphism from M to M.
Isomorphisms-and hence symmetries-preserve L + -formulas, in the following sense:
Lemma 2.4. Let M, N be L-structures, and π ∶ M → N be an isomorphism. For all n < ω, all φ ∈ L + n and all e ∈ M n :
Proof. An easy induction on complexity. 9
There is therefore a good sense in which objects linked by a symmetry cannot be discriminated. Consequently, symmetries are a source of grades of discrimination, and I shall be interested in three distinct grades of symmetry:
These have already received some philosophical attention; 10 one of my aims is to incorporate them into the discussion in a systematic way. In defining the notion of an isomorphism, the only object-language symbols which are mentioned are those of the signature; there is no need to mention '='. Nevertheless, the notion of an isomorphism-and hence each grade of symmetry-straightforwardly depends upon the notion of identity. After all, an isomorphism is a bijection, which is to say it maps unique objects to unique objects, and vice versa. This dependence on identity is reflected in Lemma 2.4: symmetries preserve L + -formula.
If we want to avoid treating identity as a primitive-for philosophical or technical reasons-then the notion of an isomorphism is probably too strong. In looking for a weaker notion, a first thought would be to consider functions between structures that need not be bijections. 11 But this is insufficiently concessive, since the very idea of a function presupposes the notion of identity, 9 See e.g. Marker 2002, 13-14. 10 s m is considered by Ketland (2006 Ketland ( , 2011 under the name 'structural indiscernibility', and by Ladyman et al. (2012) under the name 'symmetry'. s p is considered by Ladyman et al. (2012) under the name 'full symmetry'. s is considered by Ketland (2006; 2011) , who writes 'π ab ' to indicate that a s b.
11 In this regard, the notion of a strict homomorphism is often employed in the technical literature.
for a function maps each object (or n-tuple) to a unique object (or n-tuple).
Instead, then, we should consider structure-preserving relations that may hold between structures. The appropriate notion is provided by Casanovas et al.: 12 Definition 2.6. Let M, N be L-structures. A relativeness correspondence from M to N is any relation Π ⊆ M × N with dom(Π) = M and rng(Π) = N such that:
(1) d ∈ R M iff e ∈ R N , for all n-place L-predicates R and all ⟨d 1 , e 1 ⟩, . . . ,
, for all n-place L-function-symbols f and all ⟨d 1 , e 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨d n , e n ⟩ ∈ Π A relativity on M is a relativeness correspondence from M to M.
Lemma 2.7. Let M, N be L-structures, and Π be a relativeness correspondence from M to N . For all n < ω, all φ ∈ L − n , and all ⟨d 1 , e 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨d n , e n ⟩ ∈ Π:
Proof. Induction on complexity. 13
This Lemma provides a good sense in which objects linked by a relativity cannot be discriminated. So, by simple analogy with our three grades of symmetry, I shall consider three grades of relativity:
Definition 2.8. If M is an L-structure containing a and b:
(1) a r m b in M iff there is a relativity Π on M with aΠb (2) a r p b in M iff there is a relativity Π on M with aΠb and bΠa (3) a r b in M iff there is a relativity Π on M with aΠb, bΠa and xΠx for all x ≉ a and x ≉ b
Unlike the grades of symmetry, the grades of relativity have not hitherto been considered by philosophers interested in grades of discrimination. However, there is no principled reason for this omission. Indeed, a central claim of this paper is that relativeness correspondences (and hence grades of relativity) are the appropriate L − -surrogate for isomorphisms (and hence grades of symmetry). This claim should already be plausible, given that we arrived at the notion of a relativeness correspondence by relaxing the notion of an isomorphism, and given the simple comparison between Lemmas 2.4 and 2.7. The claim will receive further support during this paper.
Entailments between the grades
Having defined twelve grades of discrimination, my first task is to characterise the relationships between them. More precisely: I shall build upon some existing results to provide a complete account of the entailments and nonentailments between the various grades of discrimination. For any two grades of discrimination R and S, say that R entails S iff for any structure M and any a, b ∈ M, if aRb then aSb in M. Entailment is relativised to particular classes of structures-e.g. to structures with relational signatures-in the obvious way. In §7, I shall consider the special case of entailments where we restrict our attention to finite structures. However, the target result for this section is the general case: Theorem 3.3. Entailments between the grades. These Hasse Diagrams characterise the entailments between our grades of discrimination:
The left diagram considers unrestricted entailment; the right diagram considers entailment when restricted to the class of structures with relational signatures.
I shall start by proving the entailments: 15
14 Notation: there is a path down the page from R to S iff R entails S. So in the case of arbitrary signatures: = entails ≈; ≈ does not entail =; s does not entail ≈; and ≈ does not entail s. In the case of relational signatures: ≈ entails s; hence ≈ entails s p ; etc.
15 Quine (1976) proves case (4); see also Ketland (2006, 307; 2011, §3. 2) and Ladyman et al. (2012, Theorem 5.2 ). Caulton and Butterfield (2012, Theorem 1) prove case (5) when restricted to relational signatures, by proving a special case of Lemma 2.4 ; see also Ketland (2011, Lemma 3.22) and Ladyman et al. (2012, Theorem 9.17, 9.20) . Ketland (2011, Theorem 3.23 ) proves case (10).
Lemma 3.1. For structures with arbitrary signatures:
(1) = entails both ≈ and s (2) ≈ entails r (3) = p entails ≈ p , and = m entails ≈ m (4) = p entails = m , and ≈ p entails ≈ m (5) s p entails = p , and s m entails = m (6) r p entails ≈ p , and r m entails ≈ m (7) s entails r, s p entails r p , and s m entails r m (8) s entails s p , and s p entails s m (9) r entails r p , and r p entails r m For structures with relational signatures, but not in general:
(1). The identity map is a symmetry.
(2). The relation given by xΠx iff x ≈ x is a relativity. (3)- (4). Immediate from the definitions.
(5)-(6). Immediate from Lemmas 2.4 and 2.7. (7). Every symmetry can be regarded as a relativity. (8)- (9). Immediate from the definitions. (10). If a ≈ b, then a and b have exactly the same relations to all objects other than a and b; it follows that a bijection on M which swaps a with b and leaves everything else invariant is a symmetry.
It remains to demonstrate the non-entailments. 16 Lemma 3.2. For structures with relational signatures:
Moreover, for structures with arbitrary signatures: Ketland (2011, 8) and Ladyman et al. (2012, Theorem 5 .2) use A to prove case (1); see also Ketland (2011, 309) and Button (2006, 218) . Ladyman et al. (2012, Theorem 9.17) use B to prove case (2), noting that it is the analogue of Black's (1952) two-sphere world (which receives extensive discussion in Hawley (2009) ). To similar effect: Button (2006, 218) , Ketland (2006, 310) and Ladyman et al. (2012, Theorem 7.12) (6). Let E be the disjoint union of a complete countably-infinite graph with a complete uncountable graph, i.e.:
Fix some r ∈ R ∖ N and note that 1 = p r. (To see this, take a Skolem Hull of E containing 1 and r.) Now suppose that Π is a relativity with 1Πr. It is easy to see that, for every p ∈ R ∖ N, there must be some n ∈ N such that nΠp; but also that if mΠp, nΠq and n = m, then p = q. Contradiction; so 1 r m p. (7). Augment A by adding a single constant, c, which picks out 1.
It is simple to check that Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 yield Theorem 3.3. This Theorem allows us to see how comparatively restrictive the various grades of discrimination are.
I should comment briefly on the constructions used in Lemma 3.2. The existence of A is guaranteed by absolutely standard model theory. However, A contains two distinct objects that are 'blank': from the perspective of A, these objects have no properties or relations to anything, so that their distinctness must be brute. And this might suggest that the use of absolutely standard model theory begs the question against anyone who believes in a non-trivial criterion of identity. Fortunately it does not; but it is worth carefully explaining why.
Let Fran be a philosopher who advocates a non-trivial criterion of identity: in particular, Fran thinks that x and y are identical iff x ≈ y. However, bearing in mind the discussion of §1-particularly of a signature which allows us only to describe eye colour-Fran advances this criterion of identity with respect to some particular signature, F . Now, if A is presented as an F -structure, then Fran will certainly deny that A could exist. 17 However, Fran can make sense of A by regarding it as a G-structure, where G is some signature which is more restricted than F (crudely: we only have to say that the objects in A are 'blank' if we restrict our vocabulary). Construed thus, A begs no question against Fran, because it poses no threat to her proposed criterion of identity.
I am not trying to pick a fight with philosophers like Fran. I shall not flatfootedly insist that A exists, construed as an F -structure. My point is simply that all parties-Fran included-can find a way to make sense of standard model theory.
A Galois connection
Theorem 3.3 graphically demonstrates that grades of symmetry are to grades of L + -indiscernibility as grades of relativity are to grades of L − -indiscernibility. In this section, I shall develop this point by outlining a Galois Connection between isomorphisms and relativeness correspondences. 18 Lemma 2.4 has an obvious converse: every bijective map which preserves all L + -formulas is an isomorphism. However, there is no converse to Lemma 2.7. To make this more precise, consider the following definition:
Definition 4.1. Let M, N be L-structures. Let Π ⊆ M ×N be a relation with dom(Π) = M and rng(Π) = N such that, for all n < ω, all ⟨d 1 , e 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨d n , e n ⟩ ∈ Π and all φ ∈ L − n :
Then Π is a near-correspondence.
In this terminology, Lemma 2.7 states that every relativeness correspondence is a near-correspondence. But the converse is not generally true: let F be an {f }-structure as follows:
Then Π = {⟨1, 2⟩, ⟨2, 1⟩} is a near-correspondence, trivially, but not a relativeness correspondence.
However, there is an elegant connection between near-correspondences (and hence relativeness correspondences) and isomorphisms on models quotiented by ≈. 19 The use of such quotients is standard in model theory without identity, and the central idea is summed up in the following definition and lemma: 20 Definition 4.2. Where M is an L-structure, M is the L-structure obtained by quotienting M by ≈. For convenience, I write:
When no confusion can arise, I dispense with the subscript, talking of a rather than a M . Hence M is defined thus:
Proof. Induction on complexity.
I shall put these notions to work in exploring the relationship between nearcorrespondences on structures and isomorphisms on their quotient-structures. We need some more definitions:
I must prove that these are genuine definitions, i.e. that e(M, N ) and c(M, N ) really are functions. It is trivial that:
Lemma 4.5. If π ∈ I(M, N ), then π e is a relativeness correspondence, and hence π e ∈ N(M, N ).
Proof. Fix n and suppose that ⟨d 1 , e 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨d n , e n ⟩ ∈ π e ; i.e. that π(d i ) = e i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each n-place L-predicate R, observe:
For each n-place L-function-symbol f , observe:
To show that c(M, N ) is a function, we need a subsidiary result:
Lemma 4.6. Let Π be a near-correspondence from M to N , with aΠd and
Proof. Suppose a ≈ b in M; then:
Proof. To show that Π c is a function, consider a 0 , a 1 ∈ a and b 0 , b 1 such that a 0 Πb 0 and a 1 Πb 1 ; then b 0 ≈ b 1 by Lemma 4.6. Hence Π c (a) is well-defined. The proof that Π c is an injection is exactly similar. Π c is a surjection, since rng(Π) = N. It remains to show that Π c preserves structure. Fix n < ω and a, b ∈ M n such that Π c (a) = b. Let R be any n-place L-predicate. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have a ′ i ≈ a i and b
by Lemma 2.2. Now:
so that functions are preserved. Proof. Left-to-right. Suppose Π c = π. Fix ⟨d, e⟩ ∈ Π; then π(d) = e, so dπ e e. Right-to-left. Suppose Π ⊆ π e . Where Π c (d) = e, there are d ′ ∈ d and e ′ ∈ e such that d ′ Πe ′ ; so e = e ′ = π(
This Theorem highlights the depth of the connection between isomorphisms and relativeness correspondences. Additionally, it strengthens my claim that relativeness correspondences are the L − -analogue of isomorphisms. For, given that there are near-correspondences that are not relativeness-correspondences, one might have worried that relativeness correspondences compete with the near-correspondences to be the L − -analogue of isomorphism. However, the appearance of competition vanishes, once we consider some consequences of the Galois Connection: (4). Lemma 4.5, our Galois Connection, and case (3) show that (Π c ) e is a maximal relativeness correspondence extending Π. To show uniqueness, let Σ be any maximal relativeness correspondence extending Π. Consider any a, b ∈ M such that a(Π c ) e b. Then there are a ′ ∈ a, b ′ ∈ b such that a ′ Πb ′ , and hence such that a ′ Σb ′ , since Σ ⊇ Π. Hence, for any ⟨d 1 , e 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨d n , e n ⟩ ∈ Σ, and any φ ∈ L − n+1 :
Consequently, Θ = Σ∪{⟨a, b⟩} is a near-correspondence. So (Θ c ) e is a maximal relativeness correspondence extending Σ; but Σ is itself maximal, so aΣb.
Case (4) tells us that every near-correspondence expands to a unique (maximal) relativeness correspondence. Accordingly, there is no interesting sense in which near-correspondences and relativeness correspondences compete. Indeed, instead of defining the grades of relativity in terms of relativeness correspondences, we could have defined them in terms of near-correspondences. Or, more simply still, we could have defined them in terms of symmetries on quotient models, as shown by the following immediate consequence of the preceding results:
Equivalence relations
At various points, I have described the grades of discrimination as behaving like identity. A natural question is whether the grades of discrimination behave like identity in being equivalence relations. (Note that I implicitly relied upon the fact that ≈ is an equivalence relation in defining the ≈-quotient structure.) Ladyman et al. have partially answered this question, in noting that = p and ≈ p are not transitive (in general). 21 The following result, which employs our Galois connection, completes the picture.
Theorem 5.1. = p , ≈ p , s p and r p are reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive (in general). The remaining eight grades of discrimination are equivalence relations.
Proof. Consider the following coloured graph, G: Here, 1 s p 2 and 2 s p 3, but 1 ≉ p 3. By Theorem 3.3, this establishes that = p , ≈ p , s p and r p are not transitive (in general).
The reflexivity and symmetry of all the grades of indiscernibility are immediate from the definition, as is the transitivity of =, ≈, = m and ≈ m .
It is routine to check that all three grades of symmetry are symmetric and reflexive, and that s and s m are transitive. It follows from Lemma 4.10 that the same holds for the respective grades of relativity.
Since identity is surely transitive, one might think that Theorem 5.1 provides a knockdown argument against treating any of = p , ≈ p , s p and r p as a criterion of identity. However, this point is a little more subtle than it might seem.
Consider the discussion of A, from §3. A might have seemed to present a counterexample to treating ≈ as a criterion of identity. But any philosopher who advocates such a criterion (e.g. Fran) will maintain that we can only make sense of A by treating it as a structure of some artificially restricted signature. At that point, A no longer presents a counterexample to Fran's proposed criterion of identity, which she advances with respect to some fairly rich signature.
By exact analogy, now consider Rach, who advocates r p as a criterion of identity. G might seem to pose problems for Rach. But if G is presented with regard to Rach's preferred (fairly rich) signature, then it violates her proposed criterion of identity even before we consider issues about transitivity, since G is to contain objects which are distinct but ('genuinely') pairwise symmetric. Accordingly, Rach will simply deny its existence. She will maintain that the only way to make sense of G is by treating it as a structure of some artificially restricted signature. But at that point, G no longer demonstrates the nontransitivity of Rach's proposed criterion of identity, which she advances with respect to some fairly rich signature.
The situation, then, is slightly odd. From the perspective of anyone who thinks that identity is more fine-grained than any of = p , ≈ p , s p and r p , these four grades of discrimination fail to behave like identity in an absolutely crucial sense. (This is why Ladyman et al. suggest that = p and ≈ p violate a plausible 'minimal requirement' on any notion of indiscernibility, that it be an equivalence relation.) 22 But it does not immediately follow that one cannot advocate any of these four grades as a criterion of identity.
Connections to Svenonius's Theorem
I now want to explore some natural technical questions which have not featured on the radar of philosophers interested in grades of discrimination. These questions concern the relationship between grades of discrimination and elementary extensions. My answers to these questions, together with the Galois Connection of §4, will yield interesting entailments between the different grades in special cases (discussed in the next section). To be clear on terminology:
Definition 6.1. Let M and N be L-structures. Say that M ≺ + N iff for each n < ω, each e ∈ M n and each φ ∈ L + n :
Say that M ≺ − N iff the above holds with L − n in place of L + n .
There is a classic result connecting L + -indiscernibility with the existence of a symmetry in some elementary extension:
Theorem 6.2. Let M be an L-structure with a, b, ∈ M n . The following are equivalent:
There is an N ≻ + M and a symmetry π on N such that π(a) = b
The immediate import of the Theorem, for present purposes, is that it yields a new way to characterise = p and = m :
This raises a natural question: is there an L − -analogue of Theorem 6.2? The main task of this section is to answer this question in the affirmative. I first require some definitions:
Definition 6.4. Let M, N be L-structures. Let Π ⊆ M × N be a relation such that, for all n < ω, all ⟨d 1 , e 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨d n , e n ⟩ ∈ Π and all φ ∈ L − n :
Then Π is a proto-correspondence from M to N .
In these terms, a near-correspondence from M to N is a proto-correspondence where dom(Π) = M and rng(Π) = N.
Definition 6.5. Let L be any signature and X any set of elements; L(X) is the signature formed by augmenting L with each member of X as a (new) constant. Where M is an L-structure, Diag
The proof of the L − -analogue of Theorem 6.2 now amounts to little more than a slight tweak to Marker's proof of Theorem 6.2. 24 It is, however, worth running through. We begin with two type-realising constructions:
Lemma 6.6. Let Π be a proto-correspondence from M to N with a ∈ M. Then there is some O ≻ + N with b ∈ O and a proto-correspondence Σ = Π ∪ {⟨a, b⟩} from M to O.
Proof. Define:
, and ⟨d 1 , e 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨d n , e n ⟩ ∈ Π, such that M ⊧ φ(a, d)} Let ∆ 0 be any finite subset of Γ ∪ Diag + (N ) ; by taking conjunctions, we can regard ∆ 0 as two sentences, φ(v, e) ∈ Γ and δ ∈ Diag + (N ). Proof. We construct an elementary chain.
Since Π is a proto-correspondence and M ≺ + N , for all φ ∈ L − n and all ⟨a 1 , b 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨a n , b n ⟩ ∈ Π we have:
Defining O 0 = N and Σ 0 = Π −1 , observe that Σ 0 is a proto-correspondence from N to O 0 . This is our initial stage in the chain.
Let {e α α < κ} exhaustively enumerate N, and let D α = dom(Σ 0 ) ∪ {e β β < α} for each α < κ. Now proceed recursively:
• Stage α + 1: Given a proto-correspondence Σ α from N to O α with dom(Σ α ) = D α , use Lemma 6.6 to obtain an O α+1 ≻ + O α and a protocorrespondence Σ α+1 ⊇ Σ α from N to O α+1 with dom(Σ α+1 ) = D α+1 .
• Stage α, with α a limit ordinal:
n . Then there is some N ≻ + M and a near-correspondence Π from N to N such that ⟨a 1 , b 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨a n , b n ⟩ ∈ Π.
24 See Marker (2002, Proposition 4.1.5); in turn, this is not far from Svenonius's own proof. In the L + case, we require (partial) elementary embeddings; I work with protocorrespondences. The only real complication is the need for the detour through Lemma 4.9 to obtain a relativity.
25 cf. Casanovas et al. 1996 , Lemma 2.7.
Proof. Given M, a, b as described, we have a proto-correspondence Ψ from M to M with ⟨a 1 , b 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨a n , b n ⟩ ∈ Ψ. By repeatedly applying Lemma 6.7, we can construct an elementary chain as follows:
Here, M = M 0 , dashed arrows indicate ≺ + , and a solid arrow indicates a proto-correspondence. In the limit, define:
It is routine to check that Π and N have the required properties.
We can now obtain our L − -analogue of Theorem 6.2: Theorem 6.9. Let M be L-structure with a, b ∈ M n . The following are equivalent:
There is an N ≻ + M and a relativity Π on N such that ⟨a 1 , b 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨a n , b n ⟩ ∈ Π Proof. (1) ⇒ (2). Use Lemma 6.8 to obtain a near-correspondence, then use Lemma 4.9 to extend this to a relativity.
(2) ⇒ (1). Π is a relativity, and hence a near-correspondence by Lemma 2.7; the result now follows since M ≺ + N . This Theorem lends yet more weight to the claim that relativeness correspondences are the L − -analogue of symmetries. Moreover, it immediately yields a new way to characterise ≈ p and ≈ m (compare Lemma 6.3):
Lemma 6.10.
(
At this point, it is worth taking a brief detour from the main purpose of this paper to mention a central result from definability theory. Theorem 6.2 is often used as a stepping stone to Svenonius's Theorem, i.e.: 26 Theorem 6.11. Svenonius's Theorem. Let R ∉ L; let M be an Lstructure; let U ⊆ M n . The following are equivalent:
, every L-symmetry π of N , and every e ∈ N n : e ∈ V iff π(e) ∈ V .
Since this is one of the central results concerning Definability, it is worth noting that we can easily obtain an L − -analogue of Svenonius's Theorem:
Theorem 6.12. Svenonius's Theorem without identity. Let L ∉ R; let M be an L-structure; let U ⊆ M n . The following are equivalent:
, every L-relativity Π of N , and every ⟨d 1 , e 1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨d n , e n ⟩ ∈ Π: d ∈ V iff e ∈ V Indeed, Theorem 6.12 follows from Theorem 6.9 in exactly the way that Theorem 6.11 follows from Theorem 6.2 (I omit the details). 27
Entailments in the finitary case
An immediate consequence of the results from the previous section is a special case of Theorem 3.3, when we restrict our attention to finitary structures. This special case has already attracted some attention, since it is philosophically interesting. 28 The following result completes the picture.
Theorem 7.1. Entailments between the grades (finite structures). These Hasse Diagrams characterise the entailments between our grades of discrimination, when we restrict our attention to finite structures:
27 See e.g. Poizat (2000, Proposition 9 .2). The only change required is to consider n-types in the sense of L − , rather than L + ; but this introduces no new difficulties (see e.g. Dellunde 2003, 5; Keisler and Miller MS, 3) . 28 Caulton and Butterfield (2012, Theorem 2) prove a special case of the mutual entailment between s p and = p , and s m and = m , on the further assumption that L is finite and relational. Ketland's (2011, 2) attention is entirely restricted to finite signatures. Linnebo and Muller (2013, Theorem 3) note that witness-discernibility (which I have not discussed) is equivalent to ≈ p in finite structures, and outline several reasons for focussing on finite structures.
The left diagram is restricted to the class of finite structures with arbitrary signatures; the right diagram is restricted to finite structures with relational signatures.
Proof. Most of this is supplied by Theorem 3.3. To show the remaining entailments, first note that if M is finite, then N ≻ + M iff M = N . It follows from Lemma 6.3 that = p entails s p and that = m entails s m ; and similarly with Lemma 6.10.
An alternative route to Theorem 7.1 merits comment. There is a well-known connection between elementary equivalence (in the sense of L + ) and finitary isomorphism systems (also known as back-and-forth systems/games) on structures. 29 Using these, we can show the coincidence of grades of L + -indiscernibility with grades of symmetry in finite structures. To show the coincidence of grades of L − -indiscernibility with grades of relativity, we can similarly use Casanovas et al.'s notion of a finitary relativeness correspondence systems, which is the L − -analogue of finitary isomorphism systems. 30 However, I have not followed this route, however, since it would not bring any particular illumination to our grades of discrimination, as defined in §2. I will, however, pause to develop a slightly stronger version of Theorem 7.1. The grades of relativity and the grades of L − -indiscernibility entail each other, not just when the structure is finite, but when the structure's ≈-quotient is finite. To show this, we need a few results:
Lemma 7.2. Let M be an L-structure. Suppose either that L is finite and relational, or that M is finite. Then within M, every L + -formula is equivalent to an L − -formula. However, the restriction is essential.
Proof. Case when L is finite and relational. Let φ 1 , . . . , φ n enumerate all the atomic L-formulas. Define:
By Lemmas 2.2 and 4.3, M ⊧ d ∼ e ↔ d = e. The result now follows by replacing every instance of '=' in any L + -formula with '∼'.
Case when M is finite. Let e 1 , . . . , e m exhaustively enumerate M without repetition. So for all i ≠ j between 1 and m, we have e i ≠ e j ; that is, there is some k < ω and some
Observe that M ⊧ d ∼ e ↔ d = e, and reason as before.
To show the necessity of the restriction, let L contain infinitely many oneplace predicates P 1 , P 2 , . . . and a single two-place predicate, R. Define: Note that H ⊭ φ(2) ↔ φ(3), where φ ∈ L + 1 is defined thus:
To prove this, fix any φ ∈ L − 1 and let K be the (finite) set of L − -predicates appearing in φ; now simply observe that 2 s p 3 in H * where H * is the K-reduct of H.
We already knew that a ≈ b in M iff a = b in M. Lemma 7.2 allows us, under special circumstances, to lift this equivalence into an equivalence concerning our other grades of indiscernibility: Lemma 7.3. Let M be an L-structure with a, b ∈ M. Let either L be finite and relational, or let M be finite. Then:
Via the Galois connection of §4, we obtain the desired extension to Theorem 7.1: Lemma 7.4. For structures with finite ≈-quotients:
(1) ≈ p entails r p , and vice versa (2) ≈ m entails r m , and vice versa.
Proof. (1)- (2). Combine Theorem 7.1 with Lemmas 7.3 and 4.10.
It is worth noting that this extension to Theorem 7.1 fails for grades of L + -discernibility and symmetry. To see this, let E * be a superstructure of E (see Lemma 3.2), obtained by setting Ree for all e ∈ E. Whilst E * has only two members, no symmetry on E * sends 1 to r, for any r ∈ R ∖ N.
Capturing grades of discrimination
The twelve grades of discrimination have fairly straightforward definitions. However, the grades of indiscernibility are defined in terms of satisfaction of object-language formulas, whereas the grades of symmetry and relativity are defined are defined metalinguistically. It is natural to ask, then, which grades of discrimination can be defined in terms of satisfaction of object-language formulas. More precisely, I shall ask which of the grades are capturable, in the following sense: Definition 8.1. Let R be any relation that may hold between two elements in a model; let M be any L-structure; let Γ ⊆ L 2 . Say that Γ captures R in M just in case, for all a, b ∈ M:
Say that R is universally captured by Γ iff Γ captures R in every L-structure. Say that R is capturable + in M iff some Γ ⊆ L The target result of this section is facilitated by the results of the previous section, and provides an exhaustive answer to this question: Conjoining these formulas yields:
So there is some γ ∈ Γ such that M ⊭ γ(a, b).
(2). From Lemmas 7.4 and 8.2. (3). Exactly as in Lemma 8.3, case (3).
Lemmas 8.2-8.4 entail Theorem 8.5. I now want to explore that Theorem's significance.
As mentioned in §1, much of the interest in grades of discrimination comes from their potential to provide us with a criterion of identity; possibly, a reductive one. However, if a grade of discrimination cannot be captured by some set of formulas in the object language, this will likely prevent its use in any reductive criterion of identity. After all, if the grade must be invoked as a primitive at the level of the object language, it is unclear why we should not simply allow ourselves to take identity itself as a primitive in the object language. The situation will be no better, in this regard, if the grade can only be captured + and not captured − . Consequently, no grade of L + -indiscernibility or symmetry can provide a reductive criterion of identity.
The remaining candidates for reductive criteria of identity are therefore the grades of L − -indiscernibility and relativity. However, in the special cases when they are capturable − -which is a requirement on a reductive criterion on identity-two of the grades of L − -indiscernibility are simply co-extensive with two of the grades of L − -indiscernibility (see Theorem 7.1). Hence the only plausible distinct candidates for a reductive criterion of identity are ≈, r, ≈ p and ≈ m (in order of entailment).
This does not, however, show that the remaining grades of discrimination are without philosophical interest. After all, we might simply be interested in providing an illuminating answer to the general question: When are objects identical, or distinct? To repeat an example from §1: if we have become convinced that nature abhors a (non-trivial) symmetry, then s m (for example) could serve as a non-reductive, non-trivial criterion of identity, even though it is uncapturable + . The point is simply that the remaining grades of discrimination should not be wielded with reductive aims.
Symmetry in all elementary extensions
In §6, I connected the grades of indiscernibility with the existence of a symmetry/relativity in some elementary extensions. To close this paper, I wish to consider what happens when we consider the existence of a symmetry or relativity in all elementary extensions. In particular, I shall demonstrate a neat connection between ≈ and symmetries in elementary extensions (in the sense of L − ). To show this, I first require a general method for constructing such elementary extensions: 31 Lemma 9.1. Let M be an L-structure, and let D be any set such that
Proof. Define a function σ ∶ N → M which maps each element of M to itself, and maps each element of D to a. Define an L-structure N thus:
for all n-place L-function-symbols f , and all e ∈ N n I claim that, for each L-term τ , all d ∈ D m and all e ∈ M n :
(where a i = a for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m). I prove this claim by induction on complexity. The case where τ is an L-function symbol is given. Now suppose the claim holds for τ 1 , . . . , τ k and consider τ (x, y) = f (τ 1 (x, y), . . . , τ k (x, y)). Then, recalling that each τ Moreover, we can strengthen Lemma 9.2 in the case of s.
Lemma 9.4. Let M be an L-structure with a ∈ M and e ∉ M. Use Lemma 9.1 to construct M a e ≻ − M so that M a e = M ∪ {e} and a ≈ e in M a e . If a s b in M a e , then a ≈ b in M. Proof. Suppose a s b in M a e ; so we have some symmetry π ∶ M a e → M a e with π(a) = b, π(b) = a, and π(x) = x for all x ∉ {a, b} and hence in particular π(e) = e. Then for all φ ∈ L However, this strengthening of Lemma 9.2 is limited to the case of s. To see this, let K comprise two disjoint copies of the complete countable graph, i.e.: K = N R K = ⟨m, n⟩ ∈ N 2 m ≠ n and m + n is even and note that 1 s p 2 in K (2). Immediate from (1) and Theorem 3.3.
The results of §6 exhaustively detailed the connections between grades of discernibility and the existence of a symmetry/relativity in some elementary extension. The results of this section now exhaustively detail the connections between grades of discernibility and the existence of a symmetry/relativity in all elementary extensions. We thus have complete answers to several natural questions concerning the connection between grades of discrimination and elementary extensions.
Concluding remarks
Over the past decade, several technical-cum-philosophical papers have explored various grades of discrimination. This paper has expanded that technical investigation in many ways, but I wish to close by highlighting two. First, it has introduced the notion of a grade of relativity to the philosophical literature (along with the notion of a near-correspondence, a relativeness correspondence, and a partial relativeness correspondence), and shown that this is the natural L − -analogue of the grades of symmetry. Second, it has offered complete answers to many of the natural questions that have been (and should be) asked concerning the grades of discrimination. The technical project now seems to be complete. 32
